Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 18 | Issue 1

Article 6

2009

Eliminating Racial Discrimination in the Subprime
Mortgage Market: Proposals for Fair Lending
Reform
Winnie F. Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Winnie F. Taylor, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in the Subprime Mortgage Market: Proposals for Fair Lending Reform, 18 J. L. & Pol'y
(2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol18/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

TAYLOR REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 10:35 PM

ELIMINATING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET:
PROPOSALS FOR FAIR LENDING REFORM
By Winnie F. Taylor*
INTRODUCTION
Lending discrimination has been a national problem for
decades. Before Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA) in 1974 to combat it, lenders routinely denied
credit to potential borrowers because of their race, gender, age,
marital status and other personal characteristics unrelated to
creditworthiness standards.1 For instance, some creditors based
their lending decisions on stereotypical assumptions about
whether women in certain age groups would have children or
return to work after childbirth.2 Others excluded minority
communities from their lending areas by literally drawing red
lines on maps around neighborhoods where mostly African
Americans and Hispanics resided.3 The ECOA is a fair lending
law that proscribes lending practices that impede credit
opportunities for women, racial minorities and others who have
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to Bethany
Walsh, Dylan Gordon, and Adrienne Valdez for their helpful research
assistance. I also thank the Brooklyn Law School faculty research fund for
its support.
1
See Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s
Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29
BUFF. L. REV. 73, 74–81 (1980).
2
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES, 151, 152–53 (1972).
3
Gene A. Marsh, Lender Liability for Consumer Fraud Practices of
Retail Dealers and Home Improvement Contractors, 45 ALA. L. REV. 1, 15
(1993) (discussing historical origin of the term “redlining”).
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historically experienced credit discrimination.
Credit discrimination issues have emerged from the rise and
fall of the subprime housing market. The problems stem from
the race-based practices of overzealous subprime lenders in the
selling of home loans. This discriminatory lending behavior is
one of many factors that contributed to the market’s collapse. It
is therefore imperative that policy makers concerned about
preventing another crisis consider the impact that racial
discrimination can have on igniting or exacerbating a mortgage
lending disaster. Legal scholars and other commentators have
highlighted the discriminatory underpinnings of the crisis,4
noting in particular that some subprime lenders aggressively
targeted minority neighborhoods for the purpose of making
unaffordable home loans that were destined for delinquency,
default, and foreclosure.5 Because of these and other abusive
lending tactics, racial minorities received the lion’s share of
subprime loans during the housing boom that preceded the
crisis.6 After the bubble burst, massive foreclosures followed
with a disproportionate share concentrated in minority
communities. Consequently, these communities experienced the
brunt of the devastation that resulted from the subprime

4

See Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining,
the Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164 (2009); Brian Gilmore
et al., The Nightmare on Main Street for African-Americans: A Call for a
New National Policy Focus on Homeownership, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM.
L. & POL’Y 262, 262–65 (2008) (discussing the impact of racial
discrimination on the housing crisis).
5
Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized
Consumer Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL’Y __ (2009).
6
DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF
SUBPRIME MORTGAGES (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.
org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/rr011-Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf;
Christopher Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and
to Whom 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14083,
2007) (discussing subprime loan originations in 2005 and concluding that
subprime mortgages during this time period were concentrated in locations
with high proportions of black and Hispanic residents).
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“meltdown.”7
Some creditors use unscrupulous marketing and underwriting
practices that earn them the label “predatory lenders.”8 Among
these lenders are “equal opportunity abusers,” that is, creditors
who indiscriminately mistreat minority and non-minority
borrowers. Others engage in race-based lending practices that
are not only abusive but also illegal under the ECOA. For
example, two loan originators employed by a major bank with a
significant subprime department before the mortgage market
collapsed, described in affidavits how the bank solicited African
American customers and charged them more than necessary for
mortgage loans because of their race.9 These former bank
employees also reported how African American customers were

7

See Matthew Price, Baltimore’s Tale of Sub-prime Woe, BBC NEWS,
June 28, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/8118376.stm
(describing the devastation to the Baltimore community).
8
The term “predatory lending” describes various onerous lending
practices, which are often targeted at vulnerable populations. Predatory
lending has been defined as a syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices
that involve one or more of the following five problems: (1) loans structured
to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (2) harmful
rent-seeking; (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices; (4) other forms
of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as fraud; and (5) loans
that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress. See Kathleen C.
Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259–1261 (2002).
9
See affidavit of Tony Paschal, an employee of Wells Fargo, describing
practices where employees engaged in marketing specifically targeted at
minorities, even going as far as printing out flyers in what they referred to as
the “African American” language. Affidavit of Tony Paschal at ¶ 11, Mayor
of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:08-cv-00062 (D. Md. June 3, 2009).
Another employee described practices where Wells Fargo employees would
push subprime loans onto minority customers who were eligible for the lower
priced prime rates by deceptive practices ranging from convincing people it
was the only way to get the paperwork finished quickly to offering a donation
to the church of the customers’ choice. Affidavit of Elizabeth Jacobson at ¶
12, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:08-cv-00062 (D. Md. June 3,
2009). This same employee testified that once she received a referral for a
customer, she was only permitted to offer them a subprime loan, even if they
were eligible for a prime loan. Id. at ¶ 3.
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sometimes steered to subprime loans10 even though such
customers qualified for less expensive prime loans.11 The ECOA
specifically prohibits disparate treatment on the basis of race.12
This Article proposes action the federal government should
take to better protect minority consumers in the subprime market
from discriminatory lending practices. First, more impact
litigation is needed to encourage compliance with the ECOA and
to generate sanctions for subprime creditors who violate fair
lending laws. Second, current fair lending laws and regulations
designed to ferret out creditors who discriminate on the basis of
race need to be revised to better assist federal prosecutors in
their litigation efforts.
As explained more fully below, claims of racial
discrimination in mortgage credit are not new; however, the
context of the problem has changed. Initially, the primary
concern was denial of home loans to residents of minority
communities.13 Today, the dominant concern is excessive bad
credit in these communities that is perversely tied to mortgage
lenders who intentionally made improvident loans.14 As creditors
become more creative in devising discriminatory practices, the
10

A “subprime loan” is a loan that features higher costs than a prime
loan, both upfront and throughout the life of the loan. The defining
characteristic of the subprime mortgage is the higher interest rate it carries
over a prime loan. See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout:
The Banking Industry’s Attack on Disparate Impact Race Discrimination
Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5 (2008) (discussing subprime loans). The higher
rates are presumably to compensate lenders for the added risks associated
with lending to borrowers with weaker credit histories. See ALLEN J.
FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, SUBPRIME LOCATIONS: PATTERNS OF
GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY IN SUBPRIME LENDING 1 (2006), available at
www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/SubprimeLocationsStudy090506.pdf.
11
Prime loans are loans with interest rates and fees that conventional
banks charge their best customers. See CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION ET
AL, PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM, A MULTI-STATE ANALYSIS
OF HIGHER COST PURCHASE LENDING, app. (2007), available at
http://www.calreinvest.org/system/assets/47.pdf.
12
See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §1691 (2006).
13
See supra note 3.
14
See supra text accompanying note 5.
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federal response should include enhancement of fair lending
enforcement and stronger consumer protection laws.
In exploring the proposals presented herein, the first part of
this Article emphasizes the importance of government litigation
as a means of combating lending discrimination in the subprime
housing market. For almost two decades, ECOA enforcement
authorities have litigated race-based mortgage lending claims.
This section reviews that litigation and argues for more federal
prosecution of subprime lenders that discriminate on the basis of
race.
The second part argues for regulatory reform. Specifically,
this part proposes amending Regulation C,15 which implements
16
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), by adding credit
scores to the information subprime lenders must report to federal
regulatory agencies regarding their home mortgage lending
experience. Currently, certain lenders must collect and report
demographic and pricing data that federal officials analyze to
determine if discriminatory lending patterns exist that violate fair
lending laws. Including credit score data in the analysis would
enhance the ability of these officials to make this determination.
As explained in greater detail in Part II below, adding credit
risk information to the HMDA reporting requirements might
cause some lenders to make fewer subprime loans, especially
those concerned about greater exposure to lawsuits and more
regulatory scrutiny. However, if subprime lenders cut back
significantly in making mortgage loans, credit-impaired
borrowers, who are their primary customers, will be further
17
limited in home financing options. To address this concern, I
15

12 C.F.R. § 203 (2009).
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810 (2006).
17
The subprime lender specializes in issuing high-interest mortgages to
families with few credit options. See Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of
Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1777, 1792–94 (2004) (discussing the history of subprime lending).
Most subprime refinance borrowers use the collateral in their homes for debt
consolidation and other consumer credit purposes. See FISHBEIN &
WOODALL, supra note 10, at 1 (discussing subprime borrowers who refinance
home loans).
16
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argue that the federal government should provide funds to credit
unions for the purpose of increasing their subprime lending.
This public funding proposal is attractive for several reasons.
First, if some subprime lenders reduce mortgage credit because
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) adds credit scores to their
HMDA reporting requirements, credit unions may be able to fill
the void by expanding their subprime lending to more qualified,
higher-risk borrowers in under-served communities. Given their
non-profit, quasi-governmental status, credit unions are unlikely
to reduce subprime mortgage lending because of a new credit
score reporting requirement.18 Second, expanding the credit
union subprime market would provide potential borrowers with
viable alternatives to abusive home mortgage providers. Third,
such expansion would provide competition to predatory
subprime lenders.
By focusing on remedies and strategies for combating the
racial discrimination problem in subprime lending, this Article
brings issues of race and ethnicity to the forefront of the
mortgage crisis where they belong. Developing effective
responses to prevent its reoccurrence demands consideration of
all factors that led to the market’s demise, especially those
indicative of unlawful conduct.
I. IMPACT LITIGATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Congress gave ECOA enforcement authority to the FRB, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission
19
(FTC), and a number of other federal agencies. Claims of
18

See Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curbing Predatory Lending, 122
BANKING L.J. 483 (2005); see also infra text accompanying note 107.
19
Enforcement authority under the ECOA is divided between federal
agencies. The U.S Department of Justice may initiate a lawsuit under the
ECOA where it believes a creditor has engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination. With respect to claims against national banks, and Federal
branches, enforcement authority is with the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC); for claims against member banks of the Federal Reserve
System (other than national banks), and commercial lending companies
owned or controlled by foreign banks, enforcement authority is with the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; for claims against banks
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racial discrimination in the subprime mortgage market present
the latest regulatory challenge to these authorities. In addition to
investigating and examining creditors for fair lending
compliance, government agencies should use litigation
vigorously to address discrimination claims. Their sustained
litigation efforts will likely encourage fair lending compliance by
sending a clear message to the lending industry that ECOA
violators will be relentlessly pursued, prosecuted, and held
accountable for engaging in unlawful conduct.
The DOJ and the FTC already have experience litigating
ECOA claims similar to many of those that have emerged from
the mortgage crisis, including those involving discriminatory
pricing. Some of their groundbreaking cases are summarized in
the next section. All of the cases were settled. Nevertheless,
these cases helped establish novel lending discrimination
theories20 and demonstrate that litigation can be an effective
means of combating racial discrimination in mortgage lending.
To achieve this end, litigation efforts must be relentless.
A. Redlining
At the federal level, efforts to eliminate home mortgage
discrimination have been ongoing for almost two decades. In
1992, the DOJ filed its first ECOA mortgage-lending lawsuit
against a Georgia bank. The complaint charged the bank with
“redlining,” that is, refusing to make loans in certain
geographical areas because of the racial composition of its
21
residents. Specifically, DOJ attorneys alleged that Decatur
Federal Savings & Loan “devised ways to avoid dealing with
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of
the Federal Reserve System) and insured State branches of foreign banks,
enforcement authority is with the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation; for claims against credit unions enforcement authority
resides with the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration.
See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006).
20
See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE CREDIT AND SALES
LEGAL PRACTICE SERIES § 12.4.1 (4th ed. 2005).
21
See supra note 3.
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African Americans in the Atlanta area and avoided making
mortgage loans in black communities.”22 To support the claim
that Decatur Federal intentionally denied banking services to
African Americans, the complaint further alleged that none of
the bank’s 48 branch offices were located in predominately
African American neighborhoods.23 The consent decree that
settled the case required the bank to pay $1 million to
compensate 48 rejected credit applicants and to take a series of
corrective measures to ensure compliance with the ECOA,
including opening up a branch office in a predominately black
neighborhood.24
Since 1992, the DOJ has filed and settled a myriad of
redlining lawsuits against banks and other financial institutions.
In one such case involving a bank in the District of Columbia,
DOJ attorneys alleged that Chevy Chase Bank refused to market
mortgage loans in predominately African American communities
in Washington, D.C., because of the racial identity of those
neighborhoods.25 As it did in Decatur, the DOJ’s litigation
strategy included focusing on the location of bank branch offices
to support its contention that the bank intentionally excluded
blacks from receiving its mortgage lending services.
Accordingly, the complaint alleged that 70 of the 74 Chevy
Chase branch offices were located in predominately white
communities.26 The settlement agreement required the bank to
pay $11 million to establish a special loan program so that
mortgage-lending services could be provided to the neglected
areas. The agreement also required the bank to open up branch
27
offices in minority neighborhoods.
Similarly, the DOJ sued Albank for redlining in violation of
22

Complaint at ¶¶ 8–16, United States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assoc., No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
23
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 9.
24
Consent Decree at ¶¶ 2–48, Decatur, No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga.
1992).
25
Complaint at ¶ 12, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, No.
94-CV-01829 (D.D.C. 1994).
26
Id. at ¶ 13.
27
Consent Decree, Chevy Chase, No. 94-CV-01829.
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the ECOA. In this 1997 case, DOJ attorneys contended that the
bank refused to take mortgage loan applications from areas in
Connecticut and Westchester County, New York, with
significant minority populations. Further, the government
attorneys claimed that the bank could provide no reason for
carving out minority communities from its lending areas.28 The
consent decree that ended this litigation required the bank to
provide $55 million in loans at below market rates to the
communities that it refused to service previously and to
implement a non-discriminatory lending policy.29
More recently, the DOJ prosecuted two mid-western banks
for redlining. In 2004, the agency resolved a lawsuit it filed
against First American Bank. The DOJ attorneys claimed that
the bank unlawfully failed to market its mortgage credit and
other lending products to predominately minority neighborhoods
in the Chicago and Kankakee, Illinois, metropolitan areas.30
Additionally, the prosecutors alleged that of the nearly $288
million in single family residential real estate loans that the bank
funded between 1999 and 2001, only 4.5% went to properties
located in minority census tracts.31 The terms of the consent
order required First American to open four new full-service
branch offices, three of which had to be located in majority
African American census tracts in the Chicago area and one in a
majority Hispanic census tract. Further, it required the bank to
invest $5 million in a special financing program for residents
and businesses in the minority communities of the
Chicago/Kankakee areas.32
In 2006, DOJ attorneys filed the other mid-western bank
case and subsequently resolved redlining allegations against
28

Complaint at ¶ 14, United States v. Albank, FSB, No. 97-CV-1206
(N.D.N.Y 1997).
29
Consent Decree at § III(1), Albank, No. 97-CV-1206.
30
Id. (consent decree). Complaint at ¶¶ 17–21, United States v. First
Am. Bank, No. 04-CV-4585 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2004) [hereinafter First
American Consent Decree]. The DOJ’s complaint alleged that all but four of
the bank’s 34 branches were located in a minority area. Id. at ¶ 15.
31
Id. at ¶ 28.
32
First American Consent Decree, supra note 30, at § III.
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Centier Bank in Indiana. At the time of the litigation, Centier
Bank was one of the largest residential lenders in the Gary,
Indiana, metropolitan area.33 The complaint alleged that the bank
avoided serving the mortgage credit needs of neighborhoods
where the majority of the residents are African American or
Hispanic, especially in the cities of Gary, East Chicago, and
Hammond.34 The settlement agreement that ended this lawsuit
required the bank to open or acquire at least two full service
offices within designated African American and Hispanic areas.
It also required the bank to provide the same services offered at
its majority white suburban locations to all branches regardless
of their location. Further, the bank had to invest a minimum of
$3.5 million in special financing programs for residential and
small business loans.35
The above redlining cases highlight the historical lack of
conventional mortgage lending sources in minority communities
and the efforts of government attorneys to remove racial barriers
to minority homeownership and residential refinancing. They
also demonstrate how racial discrimination can create a dual
system of mortgage lending that can lock minority borrowers out
of lower-cost mortgage credit that conventional lenders typically
provide. When these lenders refuse to lend in minority
neighborhoods, a void is created that abusive lenders fill by
charging excessive rates and imposing other unfavorable loan
terms. Thus, conventional lenders can play a significant role in
making minority borrowers especially vulnerable to predatory
subprime lenders. To prevent such exploitation, ECOA
enforcement authorities must remain vigilant in combating
redlining.
B. Reverse Redlining
In contrast to redlining, the claims of racial discrimination in

33

Complaint at ¶¶ 3–6, United States v. Centier Bank, No. 06-CV-344
(N.D. Ind. Oct. 13, 2006).
34
Id. at ¶ 10.
35
Consent Order at ¶ 23, Centier Bank, No. 06-CV-344.
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mortgage lending that emerged from the subprime crisis focus
on an abundance of mortgage credit in minority neighborhoods;
however, this credit has been notoriously burdensome. These
“reverse redlining”36 complaints allege that some predatory
subprime lenders target minority neighborhoods for the purpose
of making mortgage loans that are saddled with unfavorable
terms, especially price inequities. Although federal prosecutors
began litigating reverse redlining claims more than a decade
before the subprime crisis, the foreclosure epidemic that has
caused devastation to many minority neighborhoods37 is likely to
precipitate a notable increase in the filing of these cases.
Importantly, the government’s reverse redlining cases have
created a template that private litigants can use to structure
arguments for proving disparate impact38 and disparate
treatment39 lending discrimination claims.

36

“Reverse redlining” is the practice of extending credit on unfair terms
to specific geographic areas due to the income, race or ethnicity of its
residents. Assoc. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (citations omitted).
37
See Fisher, supra note 5.
38
Disparate impact discrimination occurs when creditors use neutral
policies or practices that have a disproportionate adverse affect on persons in
the ECOA protected classes. This framework for proving lending
discrimination has a burden-shifting approach. The first step under this
approach requires the plaintiff to prove that a creditor practice or policy
created a disparity on an ECOA prohibited basis. If the plaintiff establishes
this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the creditor to prove that the policy
is justified by a business necessity. At the final stage, the plaintiff prevails if
there is sufficient evidence that an alternative policy or practice could serve
the creditor’s same business purpose with less discriminatory effect. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper
Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing the approach in the
context of employment discrimination); see also infra notes 70–74 and
accompanying text.
39
Disparate treatment discrimination occurs when creditors treat some
borrowers or potential borrowers less favorably than others because of ECOA
protected class characteristics such as race or sex. Under this theory, proof of
the lender’s discriminatory intent is crucial. In employment law, burdenshifting approach is used to prove disparate treatment cases. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–806 (1973).
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In 1996, the DOJ brought a reverse redlining lawsuit against
Long Beach Mortgage Company challenging its mortgage
pricing policies. Long Beach is a subprime mortgage affiliate of
Washington Mutual Savings Association.40 The complaint alleged
that the mortgage company directed its marketing efforts
primarily toward persons and neighborhoods of color that
lending officials believed might be susceptible to higher prices.41
Also, DOJ attorneys contended that the mortgage company’s
loan originators typically emphasized low monthly payment
amounts when discussing loan prices with minority borrowers
rather than interest rates, points, and annual percentages rates.42
Further, the complaint asserted that Long Beach allowed both its
employee loan officers and its independent loan brokers the
discretion to charge subprime mortgage borrowers a commission
of up to 12% above the lender’s base price for the loan
amount.43 The DOJ attorneys contended that this discretionary
pricing policy resulted in disparate treatment of minorities and
other borrowers protected under the ECOA. In particular, the
DOJ alleged that African American females over the age of 55
were 2.6 times more likely than white males under the age of 56
to be charged fees and points under Long Beach’s lending
policies.44
In the mortgage lending industry, pricing disparities often
arise from “overages,” that is, discretionary authority of
employees or brokers who originate loans to charge higher rates
than the lender’s set rate.45 Because they usually receive
40

Some major banks engage in subprime mortgage lending through
subsidiary companies. For instance, NationsCredit and EquiCredit are Bank
of America’s subprime affiliates and Citigroup is Citibank’s subprime lending
subsidiary.
41
Complaint at ¶ 18, United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No.
96 Civ. 6159 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Long Beach Complaint].
42
Id.
43
Id. at ¶ 15.
44
Id. at ¶ 19.
45
“Overage” or “yield spread,” refers to the practice of allowing loan
personnel to charge customers a higher interest rate than the lender’s base or
minimum rate. As an incentive for bringing in loans at a higher rate, lenders
frequently share the overage with the loan originator. See NATIONAL

TAYLOR REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 10:35 PM

ELIMINATING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

275

additional compensation when borrowers agree to pay prices
above the lender’s set rate, loan originators have an incentive to
make loans at the highest rate possible. In Long Beach, the
government claimed that the discretionary pricing policy resulted
in disparate treatment of minorities and other borrowers
protected under the ECOA.46 Moreover, the DOJ claimed that
the mortgage company was liable not only for the discriminatory
pricing of its loan officers but also for that of the independent
brokers. The DOJ concluded that the lender should be liable for
the brokers’ conduct because the mortgage company was
ultimately responsible for underwriting the loans and hiring the
brokers.47 In settlement, Long Beach agreed to pay $3 million
to 1,200 borrowers and to spend $1 million on educational
programs.48
In 1996, the DOJ again confronted the issue of
discriminatory pricing in a reverse redlining case when it
prosecuted two mortgage companies. The complaints alleged that
loan officers at Fleet Mortgage Company in Brooklyn, New
York, and Huntington Mortgage Company in Cleveland, Ohio,
charged African American and Hispanic borrowers higher upfront fees for mortgages than they charged similarly situated
white borrowers.49 Further, the complaint alleged that the higher
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE CREDIT AND SALES LEGAL PRACTICES SERIES
§ 12.4.3.9 (3d ed. 2002).
46
Long Beach Complaint, supra note 41, at ¶ 24.
47
Settlement Agreement, United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co.,
No. 96-CV-6159 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Long Beach
Settlement]. Also, the role that independent mortgage brokers played in the
subprime crisis is being scrutinized with an eye toward regulation and
oversight. It is the alleged abusive conduct of brokers that has led to many
proposals for regulatory reform in the subprime mortgage market. See Alan
M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
617 (2008); Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Sometimes Less is More: Utility,
Preemption, and Hermeneutical Criticisms of Proposed Federal Regulation of
Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REV. 61 (2007).
48
Long Beach Settlement, supra note 47.
49
Complaint at ¶ 9, United States v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., No. 96-CV2279 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1996) [hereinafter Fleet Complaint]; Complaint at ¶
9, 12, 14, United States v. Huntington Mortgage Co., No. 95-CV-2211
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prices, which resulted from a compensation incentive program
similar to the one in Long Beach, could not have occurred by
chance and were unrelated to the qualifications of the minority
borrowers or the risk to the lender.50 The DOJ attorneys did not
challenge the legality of the employee/broker incentive program.
Instead, they claimed that the two mortgage companies illegally
used the program to extract higher prices from minorities
because of their race.51 Private litigants have followed the lead
of DOJ attorneys in making ECOA price discrimination claims
against subprime lenders with broker/employee incentive
programs like that in Long Beach.52
In another high-impact, reverse-redlining lawsuit, three
government agencies jointly prosecuted a major subprime
lender. The three agencies—the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York (DOJ), the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), and the FTC—filed a reverse
redlining lawsuit against Delta Funding Corporation. At the time
of this litigation, most of Delta’s business was concentrated in
the minority residential areas of Brooklyn and Queens, New
York.53 Among other allegations, the government claimed that
Delta violated the ECOA by granting loans with higher broker
fees to African American women than those of similarly situated
white men, by allowing unreasonable broker fees, by engaging
in asset-based lending, by paying kickbacks to brokers to induce
them to refer loan applicants to Delta, and by approving loans
without regard for the borrower’s ability to repay.54 Further, the
complaint alleged that Delta targeted minority neighborhoods
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 1995) [hereinafter Huntington Complaint].
50
Fleet Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 10; Huntington Complaint, supra
note 49, at ¶¶ 12–14.
51
See Fleet Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 11; Huntington Complaint,
supra note 49, at ¶ 15.
52
See Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 253 (D.
Mass. 2008); Garcia v. Country Wide Fin. Corp., No. 07-CV-1161, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106675, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008).
53
Complaint at ¶ 8, United States v. Delta Funding Corp., No. 00-CV01872 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
54
Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14–15, 17–19.
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with abusive practices, thereby placing borrowers thousands of
dollars in debt and exposing them to unwarranted risk of default
and foreclosure.55 The complaint described a number of Delta’s
victims as African American widows living in Brooklyn who
had little or no outstanding debt before refinancing their
mortgages at prices they could not afford.56 The settlement
agreement that ended the case required Delta to provide
monetary relief of up to $12 million to victims of its lending
practices.57
In 2008, the FTC filed an ECOA action individually against
Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage Services Corporation
and its general partner, Gateway Funding.58 Among the FTC’s
allegations was the claim that Gateway used discriminatory
pricing practices in both prime and subprime mortgage loans
that resulted in African American and Hispanic customers being
charged higher interest rates and up-front fees than white
customers.59 The settlement required Gateway to pay $2.9
million, however, all but $200,000 was suspended because of
Gateway’s inability to pay.60
C. Establishing ECOA Precedents
Private litigants have also filed reverse redlining lawsuits
against subprime lenders with allegations similar to those in the
above government cases.61 As these cases work their way up

55

Id. at ¶ 17.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Delta Funding Corporation Settles
U.S. Charges for Fair Lending and Consumer Law (Mar. 30, 2000),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/March/154cr.htm.
57
Settlement Agreement at § 5, Delta, No. 00-CV-01872.
58
Complaint, FTC v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage Servs.,
L.P., No. 08-CV-5805 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2008).
59
Id. at ¶ 18.
60
Final Judgment at § VI(A), Gateway, No. 08-CV-5805.
61
See, e.g., NAACP v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 07-CV-0794
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009) (order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss).
The NAACP alleged disparate impact and disparate treatment discrimination
in violation of ECOA.
56
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through the courts, they may establish much needed precedent
on the legal issues surrounding the targeting of minority
neighborhoods. Precedential value could also come if
government reverse redlining lawsuits lead to full-fledged
litigation instead of settlement. Although the advantages of
settlement (e.g., lower cost, certainty of outcome,
expeditiousness) are important, it would also be tremendously
beneficial for courts to decide whether the government’s
redlining and reverse redlining claims are meritorious.
Established precedent can reveal gaps in the current laws and
provide guidance regarding appropriate ways to fill them, such
as whether new legislation is needed to further federal fair
lending policy objectives.
There are additional advantages to having judicial opinions in
reverse redlining cases. For instance, victims likely receive a
psychological benefit when courts find lenders liable for
discrimination. This benefit is absent when cases are settled
because settlement agreements contain no admission to or
finding of illegal conduct. Also, it would be helpful to know
how courts would impose damages against subprime lenders
found liable for targeting minority neighborhoods and engaging
in discriminatory pricing practices in violation of the ECOA.
The settlement agreements mentioned above require lenders to
pay millions of dollars to compensate consumers and establish
funding for various programs.62 These amounts seem to reflect
both actual and punitive damages. However, if ECOA claims
are fully litigated and lenders are subsequently found liable for
discrimination, it is unclear whether courts could award similar
damages.
Currently, ECOA violators are subject to civil liability for
actual and punitive damages in individual and class actions.
Liability for punitive damages is limited to $10,000 in individual
actions and the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the
63
creditor’s net worth in class actions. In determining the amount
of punitive damages, the Act requires courts to consider, among
62
63

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 48, 57, and 60.
15 U.S.C. § 1691e (2006).
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other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance
by the creditor, the resources of the creditor, the number of
persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor’s
failure of compliance was intentional.64 Although courts may
find that millions of dollars in punitive damages should be
imposed against lenders in some reverse redlining cases, it is
unclear whether the $500,000 statutory ceiling will preclude
such awards in actions brought by federal prosecutors. In private
lawsuits, the ECOA specifically caps punitive damages at
$500,000. The statute is silent, however, on whether the cap
applies when administrative agencies successfully sue lenders.
The ECOA’s statutory language merely states that the agencies
may recover “relief as may be appropriate,” including actual
and punitive damages.65
The Federal Reserve Board, which implements the ECOA
through Regulation B,66 should clarify whether punitive damages
in administrative agency actions can exceed $500,000. If the cap
does apply, Congress should amend the ECOA to increase it or
allow judges to decide each case without a cap. The $500,000
ceiling on punitive damages is insufficient to punish subprime
lenders who egregiously fail to comply with the ECOA by
targeting minority neighborhoods for unaffordable loans that are
likely to lead to foreclosure. Also, this amount is inadequate to
deter other subprime lenders from devastating minority
communities by engaging in reverse redlining lending practices.
To determine an appropriate amount, consideration should be
given to a lender’s net assets. For instance, Bank of America’s
67
profits in the first quarter of 2009 were $2.4 billion and Wells
Fargo had a 50% surge in net income during the same period,
68
exceeding more than a billion dollars. Also, during the second
64

Id.
Id. at § 1691e(h).
66
12 C.F.R. § 202 (2003).
67
Dan Fitzpatrick, For B of A, a $4.2 Billion Profit Isn’t a Fix, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at C1.
68
Matthias Rieker & Damian Paletta, Banks Get Boost from Wells
Fargo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at C1.
65

TAYLOR REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 10:35 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

280

quarter of 2009, the profits for JP Morgan/Chase Bank were
$2.7 billion.69 With quarterly profits like these, a $500,000
penalty for an ECOA violation is grossly inadequate as a
punishment or a deterrent.
D. Litigation Challenges In Pursuing Reverse
Redlining Cases
Government attorneys who litigate reverse redlining claims
on the merits may have difficulty proving some of their
allegations in court. For instance, claims that certain subprime
lending practices adversely impact people and communities of
color present litigation challenges. The primary challenge stems
from the uncertainty about whether ECOA plaintiffs can use the
disparate impact theory to prove their lending discrimination
claims.
As
mentioned
previously,
disparate
impact
discrimination occurs when a lender applies a neutral practice
equally to credit applicants but the practice has a
disproportionate adverse effect on applicants from the ECOA
protected groups.70 To prove such claims, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that there is a significant disparity in outcomes
between minorities and similarly situated non-minorities.71
Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided that the
disparate impact analytical framework is appropriate to use when
proving age discrimination cases.72 However, the Court has not
decided whether impact analysis can be used to prove lending
discrimination claims. Although most federal courts allow
73
ECOA plaintiffs to use statistical impact proof methods,
69

Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan Posts $2.7 Billion in Profit, WALL ST. J.,
July 17, 2009, at C1.
70
See Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
71
See supra note 38.
72
See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 239–240 (2005).
73
See, e.g., Smith v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. 00-CV-6003, 2003 WL
328719 (D.N.J. 2003) (deciding that the ECOA permits disparate impact
theory); Coleman v. General Motor Acceptance Corp., 196 F.R.D. 315
(M.D. Tenn. 2000); Osborne v. Bank of Am., Nat’l Assoc., 234 F. Supp. 2d
804 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). Cf. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F. 3d
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commentators strongly debate whether the Supreme Court would
reverse those decisions if given the opportunity.74 Fully litigated
reverse redlining lawsuits that use impact proof methods could
present the Court with such an opportunity.
E. Summary
Vigilance in protecting homeowners from lending
discrimination not only fosters a fair lending compliance
environment, it also promotes public trust. It is therefore
especially important for the federal government to prosecute
egregious violators of the ECOA. Subprime lenders that cause
devastation to individuals because of their race, and communities
because of their racial composition, should know that
government attorneys will sue them. Such impact litigation will
signal to the public and the credit industry that eliminating racial
discrimination in mortgage lending is a national priority.
II: LEGISLATIVE REFORM: INCREASED ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
AND HMDA AMENDMENT
A. Reporting Credit Score Information
Congress enacted HMDA in 1975 due to its concern that
disproportionate home ownership among various racial groups
might stem from biased lending practices or other discriminatory
conduct in the mortgage industry.75 To address this concern,
712 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting ECOA disparate impact claim).
74
See, e.g., Peter N. Cubita & Michelle Hartmann, The ECOA
Discrimination Proscription and Disparate Impact—Interpreting the Meaning
of the Words That Actually Are There, 61 BUS. LAW. 829 (2006).
75
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) was enacted by
Congress in 1975 and is implemented by the Federal Reserve Board’s
Regulation C. This regulation provides the public loan data that can be used
to assist in determining whether financial institutions are serving the housing
needs of their communities; assisting public officials in distributing publicsector investments so as to attract private investment to areas where it is
needed, and in identifying possible discriminatory lending patterns. See
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, 9.1,
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HMDA requires creditors to collect and report basic attributes of
the mortgage applications they receive in metropolitan statistical
areas.76 Under Regulation C, which the Federal Reserve Board
wrote to implement HMDA, lenders must disclose to federal
regulatory agencies and the general public, information
regarding the race, ethnicity, sex, and income of mortgage
applicants and borrowers.77 In addition to demographic
information, Regulation C requires lenders to report certain
pricing information.78 Federal officials analyze the HMDA data
to see if they identify mortgage lenders with racial or ethnic
lending patterns that indicate discrimination in violation of the
ECOA or other fair lending laws.
Initially, the FRB did not require lenders to report pricing
information with other HMDA data. The FRB amended
Regulation C in 2002 to add this information because it wanted
insight into the possible connection between the cost of mortgage
loans and the borrower’s race.79 The pricing information,
coupled with HMDA demographic data, informs the FRB of not
only who receives mortgage credit, but also who pays the most
for it. Pursuant to the loan-pricing reporting requirement,
lenders must now report information on “higher-cost” loans.
Although both prime and subprime lenders must report the
pricing data, this requirement primarily affects subprime lenders
since most high-cost loans are made in the subprime market.80
9.2 (2006).
76
12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1) (2006). The HMDA requires lenders to use
census tracts to capture these data.
77
12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(10), (b)(1) (2009).
78
Id. at § 203.4(a)(12)(i).
79
Edward M. Gramlich, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks to the
National Association of Real Estate Editors (June 3, 2005).
80
Beginning with 2004 data, lenders are now required to compare the
annual percentage rate (APR) on each loan made to the current interest rate
on U.S. Treasury securities of the same maturity. If the difference (“spread”)
between the loan’s APR and the interest rate on the Treasury securities is
three percentage points or more (for a first-lien loan), then the spread for that
loan must be reported in the lender’s HMDA data.” CAL. REINVESTMENT
COALITION ET AL., supra note 11, app. In the lending industry, such loans
are referred to as “higher-cost loans” or “higher-priced loans.” Id. Many
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By all accounts, the addition of pricing information to the
HMDA reporting requirements has been a tremendous benefit to
ECOA enforcement officials. In recent reports to Congress, the
agencies have emphasized the importance of this information to
their fair lending enforcement efforts, noting in particular how
invaluable it has been in helping to identify lenders that may be
engaging in race-based lending practices.81
However, the HMDA data do not include all variables
lenders use to set loan prices, such as loan-to value ratios, debtto-income ratios, or credit scores.82 Given this underinclusiveness, the HMDA data are insufficient to determine
whether a lender has actually violated the ECOA’s antidiscrimination requirements. Thus, instead of proving
discrimination, the data serve as a screening device to identify
which lenders should be investigated and further scrutinized for
people use the terms “subprime loans” and “higher-cost” loans
interchangeably, although there are many subprime loans (subprime because
their interest rates and/or fees are greater than those of prime loans) with
APRs that are below the HMDA-reporting threshold used to identify “highercost” loans. Id.
81
See, e.g., GRACE CHUNG BECKER, U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976 6 (2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt//housing/documents/ecoa2007.pdf;
LORETTA KING, U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2008
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT
OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976 6 (2009), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa_report_2008.pdf;
Rooting
Out
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: Using HMDA as a Tool for Fair
Lending Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 38, 42,
(2007) (statements of Sandra L. Thompson, Director of the Division of
Supervision and Consumer Protection, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and Calvin R. Hagins, Director of Compliance Policy, Office of the
Comptroller of Currency) [hereinafter Rooting Out Discrimination Hearing].
82
See Robert B. Avery et al., New Information Reported Under HMDA
and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 344,
385–87 (2005) [hereinafter Avery, New Information]. A credit score is a
mechanically determined credit rating that signifies whether an applicant is
creditworthy based on key attributes of the applicant and aspects of the credit
transaction. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 88.
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possible discriminatory conduct.83 In short, HMDA data provide
a list of suspects. But the omission of all credit risk criteria from
HMDA analyses hinders the data’s effectiveness, even as a
screening tool. Lenders can capitalize on this shortcoming. For
instance, if HMDA data show significant price disparities along
racial lines, the subprime lending industry can point out that the
findings are misleading because legitimate credit risk factors that
are omitted from the analysis could possibly justify the result.
More specifically, lenders can say that credit scores, rather than
race or ethnicity, are the cause of the racial disparities.
Undoubtedly, credit risk factors can justify racial disparities
in the HMDA data of some mortgage lenders and can help to
identify others whose disparities result from discriminatory
lending practices. Despite this benefit, there are no credit risk
data in the HMDA analysis. The absence of such data makes it
more difficult to determine which lenders are engaging in illegal
conduct, since racial disparities, standing alone, do not prove
discrimination. Because credit scores may easily explain the
disparities, this credit risk information ought to be included in
the HMDA data. The addition of credit score data would permit
more nuanced analyses that would reveal more about whether
race, credit risk or something else drives the observed
differences in the price that people of color pay for mortgage
loans.84
Because credit history information will result in an analysis
of HMDA data that is more indicative of where fair lending
violations are likely to be found, the FRB should require the
reporting of credit scores, at least for subprime lenders. More
stringent scrutiny of this sector of the home mortgage market is
needed because of the serious questions that have emerged
regarding the link between the mortgage crisis and
85
discriminatory pricing methods of predatory subprime lenders.
83

Avery et al., supra note 82, at 387.
Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy, HMDA Reporting of Credit Scores,
CREDIT SLIPS, Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2006/12/
hmda_reporting_.html.
85
See generally Melissa LaVenia, Note, Predatory Lending’s Role in the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 101 (2008)
84
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Allegations that these lenders targeted minority neighborhoods
and intentionally made numerous unaffordable mortgage loans to
their residents are among the frequently cited abuses.86 There is
public concern that these and other discriminatory lending
practices played a significant role in the foreclosure catastrophe
that devastated minority neighborhoods after the subprime
market collapsed.87 Moreover, for the fifth consecutive year
since lenders began reporting pricing information to federal
regulators, the HMDA data have indicated that a higher
percentage of black and Hispanic borrowers have received highcost home loans than have white borrowers.88 These troubling
outcomes reinforce the need for greater scrutiny of the subprime
market.
By amending Regulation C to require subprime lenders to
report credit score information, the FRB and other fair lending
enforcement agencies can identify potential ECOA violators
more accurately and therefore use their resources more
efficiently to investigate subprime creditors for discriminatory
lending practices. With a sharper tool to assist in identifying
creditors who may be over-charging minorities for home loans,
federal agencies will be able to make subprime lenders more
accountable for their lending decisions. Banking regulators are
apparently aware that credit score data can enhance their fair
lending enforcement efforts. During the 2007 Congressional
hearings on discrimination in mortgage credit, a representative
from the OCC stated that the members of the Federal Financial

(analyzing the relationship between predatory lending and foreclosures of
subprime mortgages).
86
See, e.g., Rooting Out Discrimination Hearing, supra note 81, at 106–
11.
87
See Fisher, supra note 5.
88
See New Information, supra note 82, at 376–82; Robert Avery et al.,
Higher Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 92 FED. RES.
BULL. 123, 158–165 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 HMDA Data]; Robert B.
Avery et al., The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL. 73, 94–97 (2007)
[hereinafter 2006 HMDA Data]; Robert B. Avery et al., The 2007 HMDA
Data, 94 FED. RES. BULL. 107, 135–39 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 HMDA
Data].
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Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)89 intended to jointly
purchase “an external database of credit scores” to help in the
general assessment of fair lending risks.90 Whether the agencies
actually purchased the database and precisely how they are using
it if they did, is unknown. What seems clear is that ECOA
enforcement authorities recognize that credit scores can assist
their efforts to combat discrimination in the subprime mortgage
market. Thus, the FRB ought to require subprime lenders to
report credit scores in addition to their current HMDA data
reporting requirements.
B. Costs and Benefits
Before imposing an additional reporting requirement on
subprime lenders, the FRB must weigh the costs and benefits of
doing so. On the positive side, the credit risk information would
permit federal regulatory agencies to focus their investigations
more efficiently when investigating lenders suspected of mixing
91
race and risk in violation of the ECOA. This information may
benefit some subprime lenders as well, since the analyzed credit
score data could partially explain some racial disparities in
pricing. Although these explanations would not be conclusive,
they could make some lending patterns with racial disparities
look less suspicious.92
89

Federal banking examiners that comprise the FFIEC are the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the National Credit Union Administration,
the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the Office of Thrift Supervision. About the FFIEC, http://www.ffiec.gov/
about.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). Congress established the FFIEC in
1979 as an interagency body to prescribe uniform examination procedures,
and to promote uniform supervision, among the federal agencies responsible
for the examination and supervision of financial institutions. Id. In 1980,
Congress gave the FFIEC responsibility for public access to HMDA data. See
2006 HMDA Data, supra note 88 at 73.
90
Rooting Out Discrimination Hearing, supra note 81, at 450 (response
to questions submitted by Calvin R. Hagins).
91
Id. at 42.
92
The argument that the HMDA data do not prove discrimination cuts
both ways. These data also do not exonerate lenders from discrimination.
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Despite the advantages of including credit history
information in HMDA data, limitations will continue to exist
because the credit score is only one of many risk assessment
variables lenders use to price loans. It must therefore be
remembered that adding credit scores to HMDA data analyses
will not transform these data into something other than the
screening tool Congress envisioned. Yet the additional
information will make the screening tool sharper in that it will
be able to do a better job of identifying potential discrimination.
This enhancement to federal oversight of the subprime market is
appropriate given the concern that discriminatory practices are
part of the foundation of the mortgage foreclosure crisis. Still,
other concerns must be considered.
1. Increased Lender Vulnerability to Litigation
Credit score data would likely make some lenders vulnerable
to fair lending lawsuits by individuals who believe that HMDA
data, without more, conclusively identify discriminatory pricing.
Even if lenders could successfully defend such lawsuits by
providing additional credit risk or other explanations that
sufficiently justify the pricing disparities, the expense of
defending unsubstantiated claims can be costly.93 Additionally,
the reputational harm that could result from accusations of racial
discrimination may be difficult to repair. Another negative
consequence for subprime lenders would be the cost of adjusting
their systems for the reporting of the additional HMDA data.
This cost is unknown and certainly must be considered,

However, credit score data would reduce the possibility that racial disparities
reflect discriminatory treatment. Also, some legal scholars question whether
credit scores are racially biased. See Chi Chi Wu, Credit Scoring and
Insurance: Costing Consumers Billions and Perpetuating the Economic Racial
Divide. 1–18 (2007), available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/reports/
content/InsuranceScoring.pdf.
93
Engel & McCoy, supra note 84. Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy
discussed the reporting of credit score information with a representative from
the lending industry who implied that exposure to frivolous lawsuits was a
downside to collection of these data. Id.
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however, given the need for greater insight into the lending
practices in the subprime market, this cost should not justify
keeping credit score data from fair lending regulators at the time
they receive the HMDA data.94
2. Consumer Privacy
Consumer privacy concerns are sometimes cited as a
justification for omitting credit score information from HMDA
data reporting requirements.95 Unfortunately, HMDA data can
now be matched with other information (e.g., public records of
property transfers) to determine the identity of individual
borrowers. Adding credit score information to the HMDA data
requirements could further compromise the privacy of borrowers
because once the matching is done and the borrowers are
identified, it would be possible to learn their credit scores.
Obviously, consumers should not have to worry about their
credit scores becoming publicly available because they applied
for a mortgage loan. Given the validity of the privacy concern,
it is difficult to argue that it is outweighed by the usefulness of
the additional credit score data. This, however, should not end
the discussion.
Efforts should be made to address consumer privacy
concerns in a manner that is consistent with requiring lenders to
report credit score information. What is needed is a solution to
the credit score reporting issue that does not compromise
consumer privacy. According to two legal scholars, the United
States Census Bureau has developed ways to protect privacy so
that researchers can gain access to individual level census data
without reporting a respondent’s identity.96 The FRB should
examine these methods to see if they are suitable for
safeguarding consumer privacy in the context of reporting credit
94

If credit score information is captured and analyzed with current
HMDA data, banking regulators should be able to identify more expeditiously
financial institutions with suspicious lending patterns. This approach may
therefore reduce inefficiency in fair lending enforcement.
95
See Gramlich, supra note 79.
96
See supra note 84.
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score data. Another approach that is ripe for exploration is for
subprime lenders to report the credit score information to the
FRB for its internal use only. The FRB analysts would crunch
the data and initiate investigations if racial disparities persisted
after taking credit histories into account.97 By restricting the data
disclosure to the FRB only, public disclosure is avoided and
consumer privacy is maintained. Additionally, both the Census
Bureau approach and the FRB internal use approach would avoid
exposing lenders to frivolous lawsuits.98
The FRB should explore these or comparable privacy
safeguards that would remove barriers to obtaining credit scores
at the same time demographic and other HMDA data are
obtained. Adding credit scores would promote greater
transparency of the lending practices in the subprime mortgage
market and in turn will likely increase ECOA compliance efforts
of subprime lenders. The HMDA analyses that include credit
scores will help explain to banking regulators whether any racial
disparities are due to legitimate nondiscriminatory factors or to
illegal discrimination.99
3. Access to Credit: The Government’s Role
A credit score reporting requirement might cause some
subprime lenders to curtail the availability of credit to higherrisk borrowers. The risk of bad public relations, litigation, and
more regulatory scrutiny would undoubtedly influence these
decisions. Yet racial minorities may be hurt if subprime lenders
cut back on making loans, as would other ECOA group
100
members who are protected by the fair lending laws. To be
97

See id.
See id.
99
See Rooting Out Discrimination Hearing, supra note 81, at 89
(prepared statement of Calvin R. Hagins).
100
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Newly Collected Data and What it
Means: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit of H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 138 (2006)
(prepared statement of Professor Michael E. Staten, Director, Credit
Research Center, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University)
98
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sure, subprime lending is an important element of our financial
system because it provides a way for many people with
blemished credit records, minority and non-minority, to become
homeowners or obtain home financing who may otherwise be
unable to do so.101 Given their defective credit histories, and
perhaps other vulnerabilities, subprime borrowers have few
financial options available and thus are more susceptible to
predatory lending practices.102 Paradoxically, the question
becomes whether the “access to credit” concern outweighs the
benefit of having HMDA data that can more accurately identify
possible ECOA violators.
As discussed in Part I above, the legacy of redlining
discrimination where traditional lenders have failed to serve
minority communities is a contributing factor to the problem of
predatory subprime lending and discrimination in these
communities.103 Denying loans to minority borrowers at
reasonable and fair rates creates voids that can be quickly filled
by predatory lenders that charge exorbitant mortgage rates and
fees. In essence, a large part of the problem for minority
borrowers who turn to predatory subprime lenders is that in
many minority neighborhoods there is very little, if any,
competition for mortgage loans.104 These lenders sometimes use
[hereinafter HMDA New Data Hearing]. Professor Staten voices the concerns
of Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Schmidt Bies about reducing
mortgage credit availability for higher-risk borrowers in his testimony on the
misuse of the HMDA pricing data. Id.
101
See Mayer & Pence, supra note 6, at 3 (finding that subprime loans
appear to provide credit in locations where credit might be more difficult to
obtain); see also Christopher R. Childs, Comment, So You’ve Been
Preempted—What Are You Going To Do Now?: Solutions for States
Following Federal Preemption of State Predatory Lending Statutes, 2004
BYU L. REV. 701, 709 (discussing what is predatory lending and why it is
harmful).
102
See Warren, supra note 17 (discussing the effects of predatory
lending).
103
See supra Part I.
104
See Problems in Community Development, Banking, Mortgage
Lending Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
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abusive and discriminatory lending practices. But not all
subprime lending is predatory or discriminatory, which means
that all subprime borrowers are not victims.105 As Federal
Reserve Governor Susan Schmidt Bies admonished, if expanded
HMDA data requirements lead to the “unwarranted tarnishing of
a lender’s reputation, this could reduce the willingness of that
lender or another to remain in, or enter, certain higher-priced
segments of the market.”106 Indeed, the possibility of cutting off
some legitimate subprime mortgage credit sources of people with
already limited credit options is something that must be carefully
considered before expanding HMDA to include credit scores.
On the other hand, adding credit score information to the
HMDA reporting requirement of subprime lenders could help
federal regulators better identify subprime lenders who use
racially discriminatory lending practices.
One way out of this conundrum is for the federal
government to provide subprime borrowers with additional
mortgage credit sources. This approach addresses the diminished
credit problem and consequently removes this obstacle to
allowing regulators to obtain credit score data that could better
assist them in overseeing the subprime mortgage market. Along
these lines, Professor Ronald Silverman has proposed an
attractive idea that merits serious consideration. He suggests that
Congress tackle the predatory lending problem by providing
funding to credit unions for the purpose of making additional
subprime mortgage loans.107 This proposal has several
103d Cong. 392 (1993) (written testimony of John B. Long and Thomas W.
Tucker, Partners, Dye, Tucker, Everitt, Wheale & Long; and David E.
Hudson, Partner, Hull, Towill, Norman & Barrett).
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Emptor: Let the Borrower Beware of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 11 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 195, 195 (2008).
106
See HMDA New Data Hearing, supra note 100, at 138.
107
Silverman, supra note 18, at 585–87.

TAYLOR REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 10:35 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

292

advantages. First, it would provide competition to predatory
subprime lenders, including those who use discriminatory
lending practices. As a result, subprime minority borrowers will
have alternative means of obtaining mortgage credit through
legitimate sources. This would help to eliminate racial
discrimination in the subprime market. Second, credit unions are
regulated at the state or federal level and are subject to the
ECOA’s anti-discrimination mandate. Consequently, the
subprime lending that credit unions provide is already, and will
continue to be, examined for fair lending compliance. Third, as
non-profit depository institutions with a long history of
providing financial services to people of modest means, credit
unions are likely to imbue public trust.108 Finally, as Professor
Silverman so aptly notes, “a supportive government presence
need not involve the federal government as the lender of either
first or last resort.”109 Thus, the federal government would not
become a mortgage bank under the credit union funding
approach.
Congress should fully examine the idea of a government
supported subprime mortgage loan alternative to predatory
lenders. Buying a home is the most expensive purchase most
consumers will ever make. Because of the substantial investment
borrowers make when purchasing or refinancing a home, it is
imperative that they enter mortgage transactions in an
environment of trust and honesty. By providing funding to credit
unions, Congress can assist minority borrowers in avoiding
lenders that use abusive and racially discriminatory practices. At
the same time, the FRB could move forward with requiring
subprime lenders to report credit score data without jeopardizing
home mortgage credit for subprime borrowers.
CONCLUSION
Predatory lenders are destroying the reputation of legitimate
subprime lenders who provide valuable mortgage services to
108
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various segments of the population that would otherwise be
unable to afford or refinance a home. These predators bring to
subprime lending not only abusive tactics but discriminatory
practices as well—a combination that can wreak havoc on people
and communities of color. As we continue to seek solutions to
predatory lending, we should not forget the role that racial
discrimination plays in the abusive subprime market. This
persistent problem must be addressed if solutions for stopping
the next subprime crisis are to be effective. Part of the solution
at the federal level is to bolster enforcement of consumer
protection laws. Accordingly, government attorneys should bring
more enforcement actions against subprime lenders that engage
in discrimination in violation of the ECOA. Additionally, the
FRB should facilitate these litigation efforts by providing ECOA
enforcement authorities with a better means of identifying
predatory lenders that discriminate unlawfully. Requiring
subprime lenders to report credit score data would be an
invaluable tool in uncovering discriminatory conduct. Moreover,
Congress can help solve this problem by changing the
environment in which predatory lenders thrive, namely, in
places where borrowers have few mortgage lending alternatives
to unscrupulous home loan providers. By funding credit unions,
the federal government can facilitate competition in the subprime
market and thus provide viable mortgage funding options to
vulnerable consumers. While growing calls for stopping
predatory subprime mortgage lending are positive steps in the
right direction, effective solutions must include holding subprime
lenders liable and accountable for lending discrimination on the
basis of race and other illegal factors.

